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Abstract 
Network  exchange theory  predicts relative  profits  from negotiations  among actors in 
social  exchange  networks  (Markovsky  et al. 1993; Markovsky,  Willer  & Patton 1988). 
Here we extend the theory  to allow exact predictions,  rather  than merely  ordinal,  for 
actors' exchange  profits. This is accomplished  by integrating two important  factors. 
First, a resistance  model  predicts  bilateral  negotiation  outcomes  within a given set of 
network  constraints.  It does  so by weighing  actors'  interests  in gaining the best  possible 
exchanges against their desires to avoid the worst. Second, the resistance model 
predictions  are modified  by actors'  profit  expectations.  In particular,  we incorporate  two 
factors that affect such expectations,  both common  features of ongoing exchange 
relations:  the number  of other  actors  to whom  one is directly  connected  in the network, 
and the likelihood  of one's completing  exchanges  with them.  We derive  hypotheses  from 
the theory  and test them  in two very different  experimental  settings. We  find that the 
theory's  predictions  are more  accurate  than those  of previous  versions  of the theory  and 
those  offive alternative  theories. 
Social exchange  theory grew from the application  of the economic  theory of 
exchange  to social relationships.  Sociology focuses on a problematic  area for 
economic theory:  the exchange  of valued objects  in relatively  small groups, 
where actors  seek to settle on one optimal  outcome  out of a range  of possibili- 
ties. How can  we predict  that  outcome?  And how are  such outcomes  affected  by 
social structure?  Homans (1958,  1974)  suggested that  principles  of behaviorist 
psychology  would help to answer  these  questions.  Blau's  (1964)  approach  used 
rational  choice and utility theory.  Theoretical  work on the problem  since then 
has largely  developed  from  one or the other  perspective,  sometimes  combining 
the two. 
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Both Homans and Blau illustrated their ideas in the context of dyadic 
relationships.  In work settings,  for instance,  an exchange  may entail  conferring 
some reward  in return  for a costly act.  Giving  prestige  in return  for expert  help 
is a common example.  Some of these illustrations  were quite ingenious.  Their 
very ingenuity,  however,  convinced  critics  that  the social exchange  perspective 
was tautological  and scientifically  vacuous.  It seemed that any outcome  could 
be explained by a judicious identification  of the costs and rewards. This 
criticism  was difficult  to overcome  as long as the theoretical  context  remained 
the isolated dyad. The key to theoretical  advance in social exchange  was to 
focus on  the embeddedness of  dyadic relations in  broader contexts. The 
conceptual horizon has  since expanded to  incorporate  broader relational 
structures.  As a result,  social networks  have become  the focus for rigorous  tests 
of developing theories. These developments were led by Emerson's  (1962) 
seminal  work on power-dependence  theory.  He was the first  to suggest specific 
ways to extend a model of dyadic exchange  to larger networks  of exchange 
relations (Emerson  1972). Emerson and colleagues (Cook et al. 1983) later 
introduced the concept of  vulnerability,  a  measure that predicted which 
positions  in a network  structure  had power.  Vulnerability  was based  on the idea 
that  some network  positions  are  more  important  than  others  in determining  the 
flow of resources  through  a network.  If by removing  itself from an exchange  a 
position could reduce the total resources available in a network, then that 
position had power. The amount of power depends on the disruption in 
resource  flow. 
The pace of research on structural  power in social exchange networks 
quickened soon thereafter,  spurred by Willer's (1986) critique of the 1983 
vulnerability model and a  reply by  the power-dependence  group (Cook, 
Gillmore  & Yamagishi  1986).  It was another  two years before an alternative 
formulation  was  developed that offered better predictions -  the network 
exchange  theory of Markovsky,  Willer,  and Patton (1988).  To predict  relative 
power levels for  positions  in exchange  networks,  it provided  a graph-theoretical 
power index (GPI)  based on a network path-counting  algorithm.  The theory 
challenged  some  basic  assumptions  of power-dependence  theory  and  withstood 
critical tests that corroborated  GPI predictions  and falsified those from the 
vulnerability  model of power-dependence  theory. 
In 1990 comments and responses pointed out limitations of  the GPI 
(Markovsky,  Willer & Patton  1990;  Yamagishi  & Cook 1990).  Soon thereafter, 
Markovsky  (1992)  introduced  a further  refinement,  just as power-dependence 
researchers  replaced  vulnerability  with a completely  new algorithm  (Cook  & 
Yamagishi 1992). At  the same time, three new  theories were introduced: 
Friedkin's (1992) expected value theory, Bienenstock  and Bonacich's  (1992) 
application  of the "core"  from game theory,  and Skvoretz  and Fararo's  (1992) 
application of Coleman's (1990) rational exchange model. In the next year, 
Markovsky  et al. (1993) identified a new class of structural  dynamics and 
additional  refinements  in the network  exchange  theory.  Most  recently,  Skvoretz 
and Wilier  (1993)  tested the first  ratio  scale predictions  from  four theories  on a 
variety  of networks.  Now, it seems, theoretical  developments  that  once  required 
half a decade occur within a year's time. Negotiated  Exchanges  in Networks  /  125 
Central  to theoretical  development  today is a class of networks  in which 
subtle power differences  occur.  This  phenomenon  is known as weak power.  In 
these weak power networks,  some positions may have advantages  over others 
in acquiring  resources  through  exchange.  However, unlike the advantages  in 
strong power networks,  advantages  in weak power networks  are not progres- 
sive. Over  a series  of exchanges,  a strong  power advantage  eventually  results  in 
one exchange  partner  receiving  nearly all available  resources.  Weak  power is 
limited  in range  and  magnitude.  This  necessitates  theoretical  refinement  because 
adequate  assessment  of power differences  between positions in weak power 
structures  requires  more precise  predictions  of exchange  rates  at equilibrium. 
Network exchange  theory  (Markovsky,  Willer  & Patton  1988)  and its weak 
power extension  (Markovsky  et al. 1993)  generate  ordinal  predictions  for profits 
accruing from exchanges among negotiating actors in social networks. The 
theoxy  is supported  primarily  by data from experiments  in which actors  have 
full information  about the shape of the network and know the offers and 
agreements  of all other actors (Skvoretz  & Willer  1991).1  Though  the theory  is 
well supported  by empirical  tests, we make two improvements  in the present 
research.  First,  we make the theory  more  precise:  By taking  into account  actors' 
expectations,  we generate  ratio-scale  predictions.  Our  refinement  predicts  exact 
exchange outcomes. Second, we make the theoxy more general:  We test the 
theory in a new restricted  information  setting. Correct  predictions  for this 
setting  mean  we expand  the theorys domain  of applicability.  The  theory  could 
then potentially  subsume within its scope more social settings in the field- 
buying a house, for example.  When  negotiating  for a house, a buyer  may have 
little information  about the profit her offer will provide the seller and little 
information  about the number  and nature  of the seller's  alternative  offers. 
Below we  review network exchange theory and then describe a new 
integration  of two previous  lines of theorizing:  the graph-theoretic  power index 
(GPI for network  structures  and the resistance  model for bilateral  negotiations. 
The  extended  theory  also incorporates  biases  in actors'  expectations  induced  by 
the number  of their  direct  ties to other  network  positions.  We first  test this new 
version of the theory  against  five alternatives  with data from full information 
experiments  on four different  exchange  networks.  Finally,  the generality  of the 
theory is tested by replicating  one of the networks under a new restricted 
information  setting. 
Network Exchange  Theory 
Network exchange theory uses GPI to predict power and profit rankings  in 
exchange networks. Its scope includes networks in which actors in directly 
connected  positions  engage  in a series  of negotiations  over divisions  of resource 
pools. Most interesting  are networks  in which prevailing  structural  conditions 
prevent  some actors from exchanging  at certain  times. Such conditions  foster 
power. 126 /  Social Forces  74:1, September 1995 
GPk DETECTING  STRONG  POWER  DIFFERENCES 
Network exchange theory assumes that GPI can predict power and profit 
rankings  in exchange  networks  by detecting  a position's  structural  advantage  or 
disadvantage.  Here we present an intuitive explanation  of how and why it 
works. The appendix  to this article  provides  a more rigorous  treatment. 
GPI  is calculated  by counting  paths out from a position in a network.  It 
adds odd-length paths, which are advantageous,  and subtracts  even-length 
paths, which are disadvantageous.  Odd lengths are advantageous  because it 
means a position has alternatives  or a partner's  alternatives  have alternatives 
and so on. For  example,  consider  a simple network,  three  actors  connected  in a 
line: A-B-C.  Actor A may exchange  with B and B with C, but A may not 
exchange  with C. If all actors  may exchange  only once  in a round  of bargaining, 
B gains power because the other actors compete for the single available 
exchange  opportunity  with B. We say that B has two 1-paths  while A and C 
have only one. Even-length  paths are disadvantageous  because  it means that a 
position's  potential  partners  have  alternatives  that  vie with A for  exchange  with 
the partners.  Actor  A has a 2-path  through  B to C. This  is disadvantageous  and 
subtracts  from A's GPI  score. It means that B has an alternative  to exchange 
with A. Actor B has no 2-paths.  Thus the GPI  index for the positions in the 
three-actor  line network  are 0-2-0.  B will have an overwhelming  advantage  in 
this network  because  B has a higher  GPI  score than  A and C. We say that  B has 
a strong  power advantage. 
Power  changes  dramatically  with the  addition  of another  actor  to the above 
network,  making a four-actor  line, A-B-C-D  (Willer  & Patton  1987).  Actor A 
now has a 1-path,  a 2-path,  and a 3-path.  Its GPI  score is 1. Actor  B now has 
two 1-paths and one 2-path. Its GPI score is also 1. GPI predicts no strong 
power advantage  for B in the four-actor  line network.  The  reason  for this is that 
the addition  of a fourth  actor  gave A an additional,  advantageous,  odd-length 
path, and the addition  also gave B an additional  disadvantageous  even-length 
path. 
GPI  extends  this analysis to exchange  networks  of any size and density  of 
relations  by counting  only nonintersecting  paths  leading  away from  a position. 
Only  nonintersecting  paths  are  counted  because  intersecting  paths  do not seem 
to change  fundamental  power relations  in a network.  For  example,  suppose  we 
add a fourth  actor,  Z, to the three-actor  line A-B-C.  Actor  Z is connected  only 
to B. Actor A now has two disadvantageous  2-paths,  one through  B to C and 
one through B to Z. But because these 2-paths  intersect  at B, the additional 
disadvantageous  2-path  makes  no qualitative  difference  in A's relationship  with 
B. B is still A's only possible exchange  partner  and B still has an alternative  to 
exchanging  with A. GPI  ranks  the two actors  as in the three-actor  line. B has a 
strong  power advantage  over  A, but now GPI  scores  are  more  extreme.  The  GPI 
score for B is 3 because of the additional  1-path,  while for A the GPI score 
remains  0. 
GPI  assumes that  actors  seek exchange  with a potential  partner  who has a 
larger  GPI  only if no weaker  altemative  exists. (Here  "to  seek exchange"  means 
to make competitive  offers, a situation determined  only by structural  condi- 
tions.)  Analysis  of the Stem  network  (Figure  2) shows that  both C1  and C2  have Negotiated  Exchanges  in Networks  /  127 
GPI  scores of 1. They will seek exchange  with each other  but not with B who 
has a GPI score of 2. The theory assumes that when this happens, GPI is 
recalculated  among the resulting subnetworks  of actors who mutually seek 
exchange.  Two subnetworks  in the Stem, A-B and C1-C, result;  all positions 
now have a GPI  score of 1. No position is predicted  to have an overwhelming 
power advantage  in the Stenm 
lIELIHOOD  OF EXCLUSION  IN WEAK POWER  NETWORKS 
Markovsky  et al. (1993)  identify two kinds of power in exchange  networks 
strong and weak -  distinguished  by their structural  bases and their conse- 
quences  for exchange  profits.  The source  of power in the two types of network 
is identical,  however:  exclusion  from exchange.  In strong  power networks,  one 
or more actors  are excluded  in every round  of exchange  by one or more others 
who, under  given structural  arrangements,  need  never  be excluded.  A position's 
GPI score encodes its potential to be excluded (or to exclude) relative to its 
partners.  Immediate  ties to partners  -  1-paths -  provide alternatives  that 
enhance  a position's  potential  to exclude  or avoid exclusion.  This holds for all 
paths of odd length. But partners'  immediate ties to others -  2-paths- 
provide one's partners with  alternatives to  oneself and thus decrease a 
position's  potential  to avoid exclusion  or to exclude.  This  holds for all paths of 
even length. 
The idea behind weak power is that no position can consistently  exclude 
another  without incurring  costs to itself (Markovsky  et al. 1993).  In most weak 
power networks,  either all positions are prone to exclusion  or no position is 
necessarily  excluded.2  That  is, for each  position  there  is some outcome  in which 
it is excluded  from exchange  or it is possible  for all positions  to be included  in 
exchanges  simultaneously.  GPI  registers  these  conditions  by assigning  the same 
score to all positions and thus predicts  no strong  power differences.  However, 
GPI  measures  a position's  susceptibility  to exclusion  on the basis of the pattern 
of  ties alone. Markovsky  and associates' (1993) weak power extension to 
network  exchange  theory  takes  account  of other  factors,  in particular  the pattern 
of activity  in these ties that  could induce  differential  susceptibility  to exclusion. 
In  strong power  networks, profit  distributions approach maximum 
differentiation  where the advantaged  actors earns between 90%  and 100%  of 
available  profit.  In contrast,  profits  in weak power networks  are more  sensitive 
to actors'  strategies,  and profits  from  exchange  stabilize  well short  of maximum 
differentiation.  Generally,  the advantaged  actor  in a weak  power  network  earns 
between  51%  and 75%  of available  profit.  The different  levels of profit  differen- 
tiation  between  strong  and weak power networks  reflect  the different  bases for 
excludability  -  i.e., the pattern  of ties versus the pattern  of activity in those 
ties. 
For  example,  the Stem  is a weak power network.  With  strong  power,  profit 
distributions  approach  maximum  differentiation.  That  is, if actors  negotiate  over 
the allocation of a resource pool containing  P units, profits for high-power 
actors  will approach  P and those for low-power  actors  will approach  zero. In 
contrast,  profits  in weak power structures  are more sensitive to actors'  strate- 
gies, and profits  from  exchange  stabilize  well short  of maximum  differentiation, 128 /  Social Forces  74:1, September 1995 
e.g., at (P/2) + 1 for the advantaged  actor,  and (P/2) - 1 for the disadvantaged 
actor.  In general,  structurally  disadvantaged  actors  face more exclusions  from 
exchange  than  advantaged  actors,  and when excluded  they respond  by making 
offers that slightly favor actors  in advantaged  positions. 
The Markovsky,  Willer & Patton (1988) GPI model correctly identified 
strong  power structures  in all its tests.  That  is, (1)  unequal  GPI  values correctly 
anticipated  unequal  profits,  (2)  such  profit  inequalities  were  relatively  large,  and 
(3) whenever profit levels were equal, then so were GPI values. However, 
Skvoretz  and Willer  (1991)  found that  actors'  profits  may differ  even when their 
GPIs are equal. Prediction  of these profit differences  required  a second step 
taken in Markovsky  et al. (1993):  When all GPIs are equal, each position's 
likelihood of being included in exchanges,  I (or of being excluded, 1 -  1), is 
calculated under the assumption that actors have no  preferences among 
partners.3  Then, in an ij  relation,  actor i has weak power over j only if GPI 
values are equal and if li > 1i  (see Appendix).  Otherwise,  if  -  1 and i and j are 
equal in power. Thus, likelihood of being included detects weak power in 
networks  where GPI  detects no strong power differences.  The analysis of If  is 
not applicable  in strong  power structures,  but rather  GPI  is used to predict  the 
very robust profit differences  that occur there.  In summary,  we detect power 
differences  in two steps. First,  GPI  is applied to find strong  power differences. 
Second, where no strong power differences  are found, likelihoods of being 
included are calculated  to assess any weak power differences  that may exist. 
As an example,  consider the four-actor  line of Figure  1A. GPI -  1 for all 
positions.  Because  positions  have equal  GPI,  no strong  power differences  exist. 
Therefore,  we turn  to calculation  of 1 to check  for any weak power differences. 
In this network,  A1  can negotiate  and exchange  with B1;  B1  may do so with A1 
or B2 and so on down the line. Assuming that each actor  can exchange  only 
once per round  and is indifferent  to with whom, either  B has a .5 probability  of 
seeking exchange  with an A and a .5 probability  of seeking exchange  with the 
other  B.  The  probability  that  an A will seek exchange  with a B is 1.0 because  the 
A's have no alternatives. 
Figure  lb shows a probability  tree  used to calculate  I  for each  position.  Each 
branch  of the tree shows an exchange-seek  and its associated  probability.  The 
Exchanges  column shows mutual exchange-seeks  and the I column shows the 
product of branch  probabilities  leading to each possible exchange.  The likeli- 
hood of exchange  between two actors  is the sum of the probabilities  associated 
with  their mutual exchange-seeks in  the  Exchanges column. An  actor's 
likelihood of being included in any exchange  is the sum of the probabilities 
associated  with all exchanges  that include that actor.  From  the tree we derive 
that I,A  =  .75 for both A-B pairs; IB 
-  .25; 'A  -  .75; and  1B -  1. 
The foregoing procedure generalizes  to more complex networks and to 
networks  where actors  can exchange  more than once in a round of bargaining 
(Markovsky  1992;  Markovsky  et al. 1993).  The distinction  between single and 
multiple exchange  is theoretically  important  because  it determines  the pattern 
of exclusions.  This  was first  shown by Markovsky,  Wilier  & Patton  (1988),  who 
demonstrated  that changing the number of exchanges  allocated to positions 
altered the power exercised  in every relation in the network.  More recently, 
Skvoretz  and Willer (1993)  showed similar consequences  for a new array  of Negotiated  Exchanges in Networks /  129 
FIGURE  1: Four-Actor Line and Its Likelihood 
(1.0)  (.75) 
(a)  A1  B1  B2  A2 
(b)  Exchanges  I 
1/  B,  AB1  B2  -A2  .5 
1/2 
2 
B1  B1/  Bf-B2  .25 
1/2 
1/2  B2 
1/2  A  >  B2  -  AB1  Bo-A2  .25 
networks. A  real-world example will  show  why  altering the number of 
exchanges  has such a great  impact  on power.  Auctions  are a network  exchange 
process.  The seller has only a finite amount  of time to sell any and all items at 
the best possible  price.  The  finite  period  for the auction  corresponds  to a round 
of negotiation,  that  is, the  period  in which exchanges  involving  existing  pools of 
resources  must be completed.  A resource  pool might  consist  of a single item or 
several identical  items, or there might be several resource  pools containing  a 
wide variety  of items as in a real auction.  Different  items may appeal to some 
or all of a wide variety  of bidders,  which determines  the pattern  of relations  in 
the exchange  network. 
Consider  two simple auctions.  In both we have one seller and two buyers. 
In the first auction,  there  is only one item, an antique  lamp, of interest  to both 
buyers. In the second auction, there are two such lamps. In the first auction, 
because  there  is only one lamp, the seller  and each of the buyers  can make  only 
one exchange  during the auction  but one of the buyers  will be excluded  from 
exchange.  As the bidding opens, each  buyer  must try to provide  the seller  with 
the more lucrative offer. Because  each buyer wants to make the higher bid, 
however, the offers "ratchet"  higher and higher and become increasingly 130 /  Social Forces  74:1, September 1995 
favorable  to the seller.  Eventually,  one buyer  backs  down and the seller  accepts 
a tidy profit. 
In the second auction,  each buyer (who wants only one lamp) still seeks 
exchange  with the seller. But  because  there  are two lamps,  the seller now may 
exchange  twice during  the auction  period  -  once with each  buyer.  The  buyers 
do not need to outbid  each other  in order  to obtain  the lamp  they desire,  and so 
there  is no structurally  induced  exclusion  from  exchange  and no price  ratchet- 
ing. Ironically,  the combined  prices for the two lamps may end up being less 
than what the seller could have obtained  by placing only one up for auction. 
Varying the number of permitted exchanges  emphasizes the importance  of 
exclusion as the generator  of structural  power in networks, as well as the 
generality  of the theory (Skvoretz  & Willer  1991). 
Despite the theory's generality,  the structurally  induced exchange  likeli- 
hoods that  it generates  have been used to predict  only the ordering  of exchange 
outcomes across positions in weak power networks. We now turn to the 
problem  of predicting  exact  exchange  rates  in weak power networks. 
Profit  Expectations 
Network exchange theory depicts the generation of profit differentials  in 
networks  as an almost purely  structural  phenomenon.  Profit  differentials  arise 
from differences  in avoiding exclusion  and from the sheer pattern  of ties. The 
cognitions  of actors  play very little role in explanation.  The strategy  has been 
fruitful  for two reasons.  First,  structural  factors  are often sufficient  to predict 
accurately simple  ordinal differences in  earnings. Second, strong power 
networks  have played an important  developmental  role in network  exchange 
theory.  In  strong  power  networks,  structural  determinants  are  so powerful  -  as 
indicated  by consistently  extreme  profit  differentials  -  that  actor  cognitions  can 
introduce  only minor  variation  at best. But  the study of weak power networks 
demands that more sources of variation  be taken explicitly into account.  In 
particular,  we  hold that more precise prediction requires that we  extend 
network exchange theory to  incorporate actors' profit expectations. We 
concentrate  on possible  sources  of actors'  expectations  that  might  develop  from 
initial network  conditions  and ongoing feedback  that might result from them 
because  our goal is to predict  actor  behaviors  and exchange  outcomes  on the 
basis of initial conditions. 
In exchange networks, initial conditions and ongoing feedback  provide 
actors  with information  that  they can  use to estimate  their  potential  profits,  e.g., 
the maximum  amounts  they could hope for, the miinimum  outcomes  they fear, 
and the profits that  might reasonably  be expected  to obtain.  To the extent  that 
such profit  expectations  are affected  by situational  factors,  negotiations  will be 
modified and, in turn,  exchange  profits  will be affected.  The sensitivity  of the 
negotiation  process to contextual  information  should be especially  evident in 
experimental  settings. There, the simplicity of exchange conditions focuses 
attention  on whatever  mninimal  information  is provided. 
Our strategy  is thus to employ a formal model that (1) accounts  for the 
effects of profit expectations,  (2) can be readily extended to accommodate 
situational  factors that modify such expectations,  and (3) may be integrated Negotiated  Exchanges  in Networks  /  131 
seamlessly into existing network exchange theory. In line with the existing 
theory's  emphasis  on the importance  of exclusion  and excludability,  we assume 
that a situational  factor  also modifies actors'  profit expectations.  It would be 
surprising  if it did not. We have all been  excluded  from  social  exchange  at some 
time in our lives whether it was not being invited to a party or having our 
application  to a university  rejected.  These  events  certainly  affect  our cognitions. 
The  following  section  incoxporates  the  actors'  experience  of patterns  of exdusion 
into our model. The second factor we will highlight in the section entitled 
Expectations  and the Number  of Direct  Ties.  Previous  research  (Marsden  1983) 
suggests the significance  of the number  of direct  relations  an actor  has in the 
network.  But  more important,  the number  of direct  relations  is a highly salient 
and immediately  apprehensible  feature  of the actor's  environment  even under 
conditions  of highly restricted  information. 
EXPECrATIONS  AND RESISrANCE 
The  resistance  model (Heckathom  1983;  Willer  1981)  predicts  rates  of exchange 
based on each actor's  beliefs or expectations  about his or her own best and 
worst possible outcomes.  Specifically,  it assumes  that  the point at which actors 
agree  to exchange  is determined  by balancing  two interests:  (1)  Actors  aspire  to 
obtain the greatest  possible profit from exchange.  This is their "best hope." 
(2) Actors  seek to avoid the worst possible  outcome.  This  is their  "worst  fear." 
To decide whether to  agree to  exchange, actors balance their desire for 
maxinum profit  against  their  fear  of receiving  no profit  or the profit  that  results 
if no exchange  occurs. 
In dyadic exchange,  the scope of the resistance  model overlaps  the Nash 
equilibrium  (1950,1953),  and  under  certain  conditions  the predictions  of the two 
are the same.  However,  the scope of the resistance  model is broader,  extending 
beyond the dyad. It has been successfully  applied  to a wide range  of exchange 
networks (Brennan  1981;  Wilier 1987;  Willer,  Markovsky  & Patton 1989).  Its 
predictions have also been shown to hold in  cross-national  experimental 
research  (WViler  & Szmatka  1993). 
We use the resistance  model to formalize  our claims about the effect of 
profit expectations on negotiations. It specifies how  negotiators arrive at 
agreements  through  each actor's  beliefs or expectations  about his or her own 
best and worst possible outcomes.  Inplicitly, the model may be interpreted  as 
generating  profit  expectations  for  negotiating  actors  at a particular  point  in time, 
and these expectations  then determine  whether  actors  accept  or reject  offers. 
Let  Pi represent  i's profit  from  exchange,  M; is i's maximum  expectation  or 
best ho?e for profit from exchange,  and C1  is i's worst fear or "conflict  out- 
come." Actor i's interest  in gaining  his or her maximum  expectation  is M1  - Pi 
and in avoiding  his or her worst fear  is P1  - Cf.  His or her resistance  to a given 
exchange  profit,  Rp,  is the ratio 
R1  =  __-  _ 
Resistance  is the ratio  of M; - Pi, the actor's  interest  in gaining  a better  outcome, 
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small  for  favorable  settlements  and  large  for  unfavorable  settlements,  resistances 
of two actors in an exchange  relation vary inversely for a given settlement. 
Network exchange theory asserts that agreements  to exchange occur when 
actors'  resistances  are equal. Thus,  compromise  occurs  when: 
Ml -  Pi  - cp 
Pi -  Ct  pi  C} 
This is the equiresistance  solution.5  Knowing  the number  of resource  units in the 
pool (P) such that P -  Pi  + Pi, we may algebraically  solve for the values of Pi 
and Pi.  More  than  a decision  strategy,  resistance  is conceived  as a potential  limit 
of power use when actors use the best available  strategies.  Consequently,  it 
holds promise of  more general applicability than any particular  decision 
strategy.'6 
To predict negotiation  outcomes,  M1  and C1  must be determined  for each 
actor. In strong power structures  such as A-B-A, we assume that each A's 
maximum  expectation  (MA is initially  at or near  P. However,  given that  B seeks 
only one exchange  per round,  MA declines  as A's are consistently  excluded.  MA 
may begin at or near P, but this best hope will approach  zero as exchanges 
continue  to yield ever-declining  profits.  In contrast,  because  B has no rivals,  MB 
remains  close to P. Over  a series of rounds  all profit  gravitates  to the central,  B, 
actor (Wilier  & Markovsky  1993). 
C1  is determined  by a position's  best alternative  (Willer  1987).  Strong  power 
structures  such as A-B-A  are characterized  by bidding  wars between  rival A's. 
Thus, when B negotiates  with one A, CB  is the last offer from the other  A. As 
the two A's bid, however, CB  increases  toward  P. Because  A has no alternative, 
CA  stays at zero.  The  result  over  a series  of exchange  rounds  (derivable  from  the 
equiresistance  model) is that  PA approaches  zero and PB approaches  P (Wilier 
& Markovsky  1993). 
In  weak power  structures,  an equilibrium  exchange  rate  is reached  such  that 
neither  actor  gains the maximum  available  profit or is forced to accept  almost 
none. To use resistance to predict exchange rates in these structures,  it is 
necessary  to determine  the value of actors'  maximum  expectations  and conflict 
outcomes,  M; and C1,  at equilibrium. 
In weak power structures,  actors do not initially  have a realistic  basis for 
estimating  their  maximum  expectations  and conflict  outcomes,  MA  and Cf.  As a 
result, their initial expectations may be  either optimistic or  pessimistic. 
However,  all equiresistance  solutions  assume  that  actors  have expectations  and 
that over a series of exchanges  they come to be more or less realistic.  Thus,  we 
assume that during the interaction  process  actors  learn  more realistic  expecta- 
tions. For example, when initial expectations  are too optimistic, actors are 
excluded by others and eventually adjust their expectations  downward. If 
expectations  are initially too pessimistic,  then actors always gain agreements 
and eventually adjust their expectations  upward. As a result, expectations 
become  increasingly  realistic.  This model of actors'  responses  to inclusion  and 
exclusion conforms  to the scope specifications  for offer adjustments  first de- 
scribed by Markovsky,  Willer & Patton (1988).  Here, however, we make the 
more specific  suggestion  that  actors  adjust  their  offers  in response  to changes  in 
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Below,  we offer  a two-part  solution  for the problem  of predicting  exchange 
rates  in weak power networks.  First  we predict  the equilibrium  exchange  rate. 
If actors  adjust  expectations  as we assume  they do, then  expectations  will come 
to correspond  more  closely to actors'  likelihoods  of being  included  in exchange. 
The result will be a fairly stable equilibrium  exchange  rate. 
Second,  we note that  initial  rates  may not be like equilibrium  rates.  Because 
actors  do not initially  know their  likelihood  of being  included  in exchange,  their 
expectations  for maximum  profit and their  worst fears  must have other  bases. 
Initial  expectations  may or may not be realistic.  We also offer  a simple model 
for initial  expectations  from  which actors  move, as a consequence  of interaction, 
toward equilibrium.  These initial expectations  likely have an enduring  impact 
on exchange  rates. In a final step, we complete our theory  by combining  the 
model of initial expectations  with equilibrium  exchange  rate predictions.  In 
effect,  our predictions  assume that  actors'  beliefs  remain  biased to some degree 
by initial expectations. 
RESISrANCE  AND THE LIKELIHOOD  OF BEING INCLUDED 
We approach the problem of specifying the value of conflict outcomes and 
maximum  expectations  in weak power networks  by first  identifying  theoretical 
restrictions  for C1  and Mi. Within  these theoretical  limits,  we then assume that 
C1  and M1 are proportional to an actor's likelihood of being included in 
exchange.  That  is, an actor's  expectations  for profit,  her or his worst fears and 
best hopes, depend on how often  she or he expects  to be included  in profitable 
exchange. The  assumption of  simple  proportionality between inclusion 
expectations  and likelihood of being included results  in a modified resistance 
equation  that  can be used to make  exact  predictions  of exchange  rates  between 
actors  in weak power networks. 
The conflict  expectation,  Ci,  depends on the actor's  expectations  regarding 
available  exchange  alternatives,  as noted above.  For example  in the four-actor 
line network,  Al-Bl-B2-A2,  if B1  knows that  A1  will agree  to an equal division of 
profit  at 12:12,  then B1  will not accept  11 from B2.  However,  as Yamagishi  and 
Cook (1990)  noted, actors  are not always certain  of their  alternatives.  Nonethe- 
less, weak power limits the range  of conflict  outcomes:  the lower  limit is zero  - 
the amount an excluded  actor  receives  -  and the upper limit is half the total 
resource  pool, as we wili next explain. 
In all weak power networks,  actors  cannot  consistently  exclude  others  from 
exchange  without themselves  suffering  losses.7  Stili assuming  24-unit  resource 
pools, this can be illustrated  using the four-actor  line. Suppose that CM  is 
greater  than 12, an equal division of the profit  pool. This means that  B1  would 
refuse offers of less than 13. That  is, B1  will refuse an equal division of profit 
and hold out for more. Because  B, cannot  consistently  exclude  B2,  however,  B2 
wili not be penalized  for refusing  to exchange  with B1  at this rate.  As long as B1 
demands  13 from  B2,  B2  effects  a temporary  break  in the network  by exchanging 
with A2 at no worse than 12:12.  For B1 to ever reestablish  the possibility of 
exchanging  with B2 (and thus reestablish  weak power over Al), CM  must be 
reduced to 12, an equal division of the profit pool, or lower. Therefore,  it is 
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structures  is limited  to the range  from  zero to half the size of the resource  pool. 
Similarly,  M1  is restricted  to the range 12-24. MA  may be close to the total 
resource  pool when exchange  begins,  but it cannot  go below half the pool. Half 
the pool is always a competitive  offer because no actor is ever consistently 
excluded. 
At issue now is how to determine  C1  and M1  from  initial  conditions  within 
these theoretically  determined  ranges.  We do so using 1,  the likelihood  of being 
included, as derived from weak power calculations  (Markovsky  et al. 1993). 
Two assumptions  integrate  resistance  with Network  Exchange  Theory.  First, 
Equiresistance  Assumption:  In  weak  power  relations,  actors'  profits  approach  equiresistance 
solutions  over a series  of exchanges. 
To the extent  that  actors  use effective  strategies  to seek maximum  profits,  their 
profits  should conform  to the resistance  predictions.  For  example,  the behavior 
of more experienced  actors  or those with better  training  should conform  more 
closely to resistance  1>redictions  than the behavior  of less experienced  or less 
well trained  subjects. The idea that  resistance  predicts  a profit  limit reached  at 
equilibrium  after a series of exchanges allows application  of the theory to 
exchange  situations  in which actors  have different  amounts  of information  and 
training. 
Second, we  theoretically  link inclusion probabilities  to actors' conflict 
outcomes  and  best-hope  outcomes  in the  resistance  equation.  We  assume  that  an 
actor's perceived best-hope and conflict outcomes are proportional  to that 
actor's  likelihood  of being included  in exchange.  For  example,  an actor  who is 
consistently  included  and who makes  a profit  would resist  offers  that  are  lower 
than  she or he is accustomed  to receive.  The  fact that  she or he is very likely to 
be included  in exchange  has increased  her or his point of conflict.  Conversely, 
a frequently  excluded  actor,  accustomed  to receiving  no profit  much  of the time, 
would accept  a low offer.  The actor's  low likelihood  of exchange  has reduced 
her or his point of conflict.  The same argument  can be made for actors'  best 
hopes.  Actors  consistently  included  in exchange  should  have  higher  aspirations 
for profit than should actors  consistently  excluded  from exchange. 
Markovsky  et al. (1993)  demonstrated  that  likelihood  of being included (li) 
ranks the power of positions in weak power networks.  On this evidence,  we 
assume that 1i will  successfully rank power positions even where power 
differences  are very small. Further,  we assume that larger differences  in Ii 
identify  larger  differences  in power between  positions.  That  is, we assume  that 
weak power is proportional  to a position's 1i.  If as we suggest, this occurs 
because likelihood of being included acts on points of conflict (Ce)  and best 
hopes (M,),  then setting Ci and Mi proportional  to Ii should provide a good 
indicator  of an actor's  power. 
The following resistance-likelihood  assumption  expresses  the idea that Ci 
and Mi are proportional  to Ii within their respective ranges. Our analysis 
demonstrated  that Ci  is limited to a range  between  zero and half the resource 
pool. Similarly,  Mi is limited  to a range  from  half the resource  pool to the entire 
pool. This  assumption  predicts  that  the difference  in profits  for high-power  and 
low-power actors  in a weak power relation  depends  upon their  likelihoods  of 
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Resistance-Likelihood  Assumption:  The higher an actor's  likelihood  of being included  In 
exchange,  (1) the higher  the actores  perceived  conflict  outcome,  C, and (2) the higher 
the actor's  maximum  profit  expectation,  Mi. Formally, 
C, = PI,  (1) 
M = 2 (  + 1)  (2) 
In words, the perceived  worst-case  exchange  outcome  (C,)  is a fraction  of half 
the pool, and that  fraction  is larger  for higher  likelihoods  of being included  (1I), 
and smaller  for lower Ii. As explained  above, C, is limited to at most half the 
resource  pool in weak power situations.  Equation  (1)  expresses  the assumption 
that  C, is proportional  to 1i  and ranges  between  zero and half  the resource  pool.9 
Similarly,  an actor's  maximum  expectation  for profit  (M,) is half the pool plus 
a fraction  of half the pool. We also showed that M is restricted  to be at least 
half the resource pool but not more than the total pool, P, in weak power 
situations.  Equation  (2)  expresses  the assumption  that  Mi  is proportional  to 1i  on 
that range.  In weak power situations  at equilibrium,  it follows from equations 
1 and 2 that  MA  is a direct  function  of C,, i.e., MA  -  C, + P/2.  This feature  pays 
considerable  dividends in simplifying calculations  and serves as a plausible 
assumption  about perceived  best- and worst-case  outcomes. 
The  resistance  model, resistance-likelihood  assumption,  and a little algebra 
yield the following prediction:L1 
(P  + C, -  Co) 
P-  2 
Pi - P-P,. 
In the Stem  network  (Figure  2), for example,  likelihoods  of being included  for 
positions A and B are 'A -  1, IB  -  .6. Assuming a typical 24-point resource pool, 
P, we can calculate profit distributions  for the A-B relation. First, by the 
resistance-likelihood  assumption,  CA -  (24  / 2) * 1 -  12, and CB = (24  / 2) * .6 
-  7.2. Next,  profits are calculated to  be PA -  (P +  CA -  C;)/  2  -  14.4, and 
PB = P  -  PA -  9.6. Profits  for any position in any weak power network  can be 
predicted  by this method  if the network  structure  and total  value of each  profit 
pool are known. Likelihood  of being included indicates  the structural  power 
advantage  of a network  position.  By balancing  two competing  motives -  the 
desire to increase  profit and the need to reach  agreement  and avoid exclusion 
-actors  reach  an equilibrium  level of profit  that  is proportional  to their  relative 
likelihood  of being included. 
EXPECTATIONS  AND THE  NUMBER  OF  D1lECT7  TIES 
In addition  to the factors  that  we have previously  related  to profit  expectations, 
there  is good reason  to assume  that the number  of an actor's  direct  relations  in 
the network may also play an important  role. In the parlance of network 
analysis, this refers to the actor's  degree.  Marsden  (1983)  employed a similar 
idea in his theory of power in exchange  networks.  Where ti is the number  of 
actor i's direct network ties, he defined log(t,/t,) as one of several factors 
affecting  i's "price-maling'  behavior  in exchanges  withj. Although  some of his 136 /  Social Forces  74:1, September 1995 
FIGURE  2: Three  Weak  Power Networks  and Likelihoods  of Inclusion 
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model's predictions diverge from experimental  test results, the notion that 
degree  biases actors'  price negotiations  in weak power situations  has not been 
tested directly and may still be sound. Further  justification  is found in the 
judgment  heuristics  literature  (e.g., Kahneman,  Slovic & Tversky  1982). In a 
wide variety  of judgment  contexts,  informational  anchors  have been shown to 
bias judgments of such properties  as magnitude,  numerosity,  value, weight, 
color, loudness, pitch, etc. For example,  a contrast  anchor  effect occurs  when 
yesterday's  95 degree  temperature  (the  anchor)  makes  today's  78 degrees  seem 
cool.  Today's judged temperature  is  biased away from yesterday's. The 
assimilation  anchor  effect  is often  found in negotiation  settings  where  an initial 
offer (the anchor) may be blatantly unrealistic,  but subsequent offers and 
counteroffers  are still pulled toward that initial offer. (For more detailed 
examples  and applications  see Helson & Kozaki  1968  and Kahneman,  Slovic & 
Tversky  1982.) 
Assuming  that  human  actors  cannot  fully evaluate  the ramifications  of their 
location in  a  network structure -  especially when  lacking systemwide 
information  -  it is reasonable  to presume  that  information  of a more localized Negotiated  Exchanges  in Networks  /  137 
nature  becomes  especially  salient.  The  number  of one's direct  ties is just such a 
piece of information.  An actor  with more  direct  network  relations  will probably 
expect to have more successful negotiations  than an actor with fewer direct 
relations.  It seems plausible  that  an actor  with many  potential  exchange  partners 
would expect a better chance of being included in exchange  than would an 
actor with only  one or very few  exchange partners. Of course, network 
exchange theory shows that this expectation  is not necessarily  justified.  The 
extent to which having alternative  partners  can benefit an actor depends on 
broader network patterns, e.g., the altemative relations of  each of  one's 
alternative  relations.  Nevertheless,  an actor's  degree  is a highly salient  piece of 
information  in network  exchan e contexts  and should thus bias profit  expecta- 
tions via an assimilation  effect.  1 This idea is captured  in the following: 
Degree  Assumption:  The  higher  an  actor's  degree,  the  higher  the  actor's  expected  profit. 
An actor with higher profit expectations is  assumed to  adopt a  tougher 
bargaining  stance, e.g., to make lower offers to others, and to have higher 
thresholds  of acceptability  for  incoming  offers.  If  negotiating  actors  have  equally 
high degrees,  however,  degree  would not provide  special  advantages  to either. 
Therefore,  our index of relative  degree (d,i)  for actor  i in the i-j relation  must 
actually be based on the relative number of ties (t) for each actor. This is 
accomplished  in the formula 
(t +  tj) 
This specification  standardizes  the index to a 0-1 scale, a useful property  when 
we combine  d with other  components  of the theory.  As a structural  measure,  di, 
does not depend on actors' knowing one another's  degree. It captures  what 
might be called the expectation  advantage  of one actor  relative  to another  -  a 
condition that wirl then manifest  itself in the dynamics  and outcomes of the 
negotiation  process. 
RESISTANCE  AND DEGREE 
Degree is assumed to bias profit expectations.  Therefore,  in the model, we 
incorporate  the relative degree index as a biasing factor for best-hope and 
worst-fear  outcomes. Given that we have already defined M (the maximum 
hoped-for  profit)  to be a function  of C (the conflict  or worst-fear  outcome)  in 
weak power networks,  we need to show only how relative  degree affects  the 
latter.  We assume that,  in the same manner  as the likelihood  of being included, 
the higher  the degree,  the greater  the inflation  of the actor's  worst-fear  outcome: 
Resistance-Degree  Assumption:  The  higher  an actor's  relative  degree,  the higher  the actor's 
perceived  conflict  outcome. 
Combining  this assumption  with the resistance-likelihood  assumption  yields 
We now subscript  C  by both i and j,  because  the inclusion  of the biasing  factor, 
dU,  in the equation  implies that i's expected  conflict  outcome  may be different 
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example,  and using the earlier  formulas  for Pi and P with a 24-point  resource 
pool, dA;  - 3 / (3 + 1) - 3/4. Substituting  the values for  variables  in the equation, 
CAB  =24/2  * 1 * 3/4  =  9; CBA  = 24/2  * .6 * 1/4=1.8.  Then we can solve  for 
the prediction  that  incorporates  both  resistance  and  relative  degree  into the GPI 
model,  PA=  (24 + 9  -  1.8)/2=15.6,  and  PB  =8.4.  We  label  this  elaborated 
model GPI-RD. 
Higher  relative  degree  is thus assumed  to bias the effects  of the likelihood 
of being included.  However, because  advantages  in relative  degree are based 
only on actors'  expectations  and not on actual  structural  advantages,  there  is a 
potential  cost to actors  who try to exploit degree  advantages.  Though  an actor 
with more  potential  exchange  partners  may be a tougher  negotiator  and receive 
more  resources  from  completed  exchanges,  such  exchanges  may  be less frequent 
than  for actors  of lower degree.  This is because  higher-degree  actors  are prone 
to tougher  negotiation  than  is warranted  by their  actual  structural  positions.  The 
result  would be higher  profit  when exchange  occurs,  but a higher  likelihood  of 
being excluded from exchanges. In addition, actors with fewer potential 
exchange  partners  still seek more favorable  alternative  agreements  whenever 
possible.  In networks  where all actors  can be excluded  -  1i  less than  1.0 for all 
actors  -  a situation  could arise  in which an advantaged  actor  is excluded  from 
exchange  so frequently  that  she or he can actually  acquire  fewer  resources  than 
the disadvantaged  actor over a series of exchanges.  Markovsky  et al. (1993) 
report this phenomenon  in the "Kite"  network (Figure  2). Subjects  in the D 
position  have an advantage  over those  in E positions  both  in likelihood  of being 
included, .82 to .79, and relative  degree,  4/6  to 2/6. For experienced  subjects, 
despite the very small advantage  in likelihood  of being included,  D position 
subjects  averaged  a 14:10  profit  point advantage  in exchanges  with E partners. 
However for D these victories  were Pyrrhic.  Ds were excluded  -  and earned 
no profit  -  on 41%  of rounds,  while Es  were excluded  on only 15%  of rounds.23 
Es preferred  to exchange  with each other  rather  than the more aggressive  D. It 
seems strange  that  a high-power  actor  can actually  earn  less overall  than  a low- 
power partner.  Incorporating  degree into the theory  explains this result -  a 
result that previously had been considered  anomalous.  Though  frequency  of 
exchange  can also be predicted  using likelihood  of being included  and degree 
(Skvoretz  & Lovaglia  n.d.),  here  we focus on testing  the  model's  predictions  for 
exchange  profits. 
Method 
We tested  the model's  predictions  using experimental  data  from  four  networks. 
Subjects  in the test setting  had full information  on the  network  structure  and on 
all other  actors'  exchange  outcomes.  We also replicated  the test on one of these 
networks  using a restricted  information  setting where each subject  knew only 
his or her own dealings with potential  exchange  partners  and his or her own 
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EXPERMENT  1: "FULL  INFORMATION"  NETWORKS 
Skvoretz  and Willer  (1991)  described  in detail  the experimental  setting  used for 
these tests. Custom  software  ("ExNet")  was used to configure  networked  PCs 
into "virtual"  exchange  networks.  ExNet  can establish  networks  of any shape 
and size, limited only by the number  of PCs.  Subjects  in experiments  know the 
network structures and their positions within them. In an initial session, 
assistants  explain  how to make  offers  and  counteroffers,  what it means  to divide 
the 24-point  resource  pool, the dollar  value of profit  units, and that exclusion 
from exchange  yields no points for that  round.  A practice  session familiarizes 
subjects  with the operation  of the system.  Subjects  then  return  at a later  date to 
participate  in  the actual research.  In the experiments,  each subject rotates 
through  all network positions, negotiating  for a total of four rounds at each 
position.  The computer  records  the timing  and content  of all communications. 
We investigated  four experimental  structures  of theoretical  import (Fig- 
ure la and Figure  2). The  Double  Branch  2 is a simple  weak  power  network  that 
allows two positions multiple exchanges.  It was converted  from a strong to a 
weak power structure  via a two-exchange  rule:  The central  Fs could exchange 
up to twice per round.  Actors  are only allowed one exchange  per round  in the 
other  structures.  These  networks  also have  interesting  theoretical  properties  that 
warranted  our attention:  The  four-line  is the simplest  weak power network;  the 
Stem  and Kite  sparked  a debate  between  competing  research  programs  over the 
validity  of the GPI  (Markovsky,  Willer  & Patton  1990;  Yamagishi  & Cook  1990); 
and in the Kite,  no position is guaranteed  inclusion. 
Five  alternative theories are capable of  generating ratio-scale profit 
predictions  for  positions  in weak  power  networks.  Most  of these  were presented 
in a special issue of Social  Networks  (Bienenstock  & Bonacich  1992;  Cook & 
Yamagishi 1992; Friedkin 1992; Skvoretz & Fararo  1992). Bienenstock  and 
Bonacich's  core theory  takes  a game-theoretic  approach.  Cook  and Yamagishi's 
equidependence  theory  extends  the power-dependence  program  originated  by 
Emerson  (1962).  Friedkin's  expected  value theory  developed  out of his work on 
network  analysis  in general.  Skvoretz  and Fararo  (1992)  apply Coleman's  (1973, 
1990) rational exchange theory to  these exchange structures.  In addition, 
Skvoretz  and Willer (1993)  present exchange  resistance  theory,  a model that 
incorporates  resistance  into the GPI but does not include degree. These five 
theories  are briefly described  below. Except  for Coleman's  rational  exchange 
model, Skvoretz  and Willer (1993)  provide details for using each to calculate 
predicted  exchange  outcomes. 
CORE  THEORY 
Core theory  (Bienenstock  & Bonacich  1992,  1993)  models network  exchange  in 
terms  of cooperative  game  theory.14  Three  rationality  criteria  establish  the  "core" 
of an exchange  network.  First,  agreements  are individually  rational  when each 
actor's  profit  is equal to or greater  than the profit  that could be earned  by not 
exchanging.  That  is, actors  are assumed  to exchange  only when they receive  at 
least as much profit from agreement  as they do from being excluded from 
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when the sum of the profit of both actors is at least as much as could be 
obtained if they exchanged with other partners.  Third, group (or network) 
rationality  obtains  when the total  profit  of all positions  of the network  is at least 
as large as the total profit available from some other pattern of exchange 
agreements. 
The core of an exchange  network  usually narrows  the range of preferable 
exchange  rates but does not necessarily  predict a single ratio-scale  exchange 
outcome.  To make  predictions  when this occurs,  we follow Skvoretz  and Fararo 
(1992)  in assuming  that  each  core  outcome  is equally  likely  and then  average  the 
payoffs to various positions. In some cases, networks  contain no core at all, 
which precludes  a prediction. 
RATIONAL EXCHANGE  THEORY 
Coleman's  (1973,  1990) rational  exchange  model is not easily applied to our 
exchange  networks  because  it operates  under  scope conditions  that  differ  from 
those of other network exchange  theories.  It assumes,  for instance,  that every 
actor  may exchange  with any other  actor  in a network.  Marsden's  (1983)  model 
solves the problem  by adding network  restrictions  and a variety  of additional 
assumptions.  However, he noted that some predictions  ran contrary  to data 
previously  published.  Coleman  partially  solved the problem  by assuming  that 
there  are transaction  costs between  actors.  When  transaction  costs are  high, they 
effectively  prohibit  exchange  from  occurring,  thus  setting  the  stage  for  structural 
power to emerge.  As it stands,  however,  Coleman's  conception  of power is not 
relational.  Power  manifests  in an actor's  resource  holdings  rather  than  in her or 
his relative ability to extract  resources  through exchanges.  Also, it does not 
address the situation where one actor's exchange is contingent on whether 
another  actor  exchanges.  Skvoretz  and Fararo  (1992)  have modified  and added 
assumptions  to Coleman's  theory  to make  it applicable  in the kind of exchange 
networks  discussed  here.  Predictions  for the Coleman  model are  based on their 
analysis.  A technical  description  of the method and a computer  program  that 
calculates  predictions  are available  from the second-named  author  on request. 
EQUIDEPENDENCE  THEORY 
Equidependence  theory  (Cook  & Yamagishi  1992)  assumes  that  actors  compare 
how much they will receive  in exchange  with a potential  partner  against  how 
much they could get in exchange with some other partner.  The difference 
between what an actor can obtain  from this exchange  relation  and that of an 
alternative  relation  is deemed  to be the dependence  of the actor  on the potential 
partner.  This comparison  process goes on simultaneously  with all an actor's 
direct  ties. Actors are assumed to exchange  at a point where their dependence 
on the relation  is equal to the dependence  of their  potential  partner.  In other 
words, exchange  occurs  when actors  are equidependent,  and each  actor  can get 
no more  profit  by some alternative  exchange.  An actor's  reward  from  exchange 
is given by the equation  Ri1  = (Pi;  + Aij  - Aji)/2, where  Rij  is the profit  that  actor 
i obtains in exchange  with partner  j; Pij is the pool size, and Aij is the best 
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Cook  and Yamagishi  use the example  of two actors,  i and  j, negotiating  over 
a 24 point resource  pool. Actor i has another  partner  who offers i 10 points, 
while j has no other  partner.  If i and  j were to divide the pool at 13 for i and 11 
for  j, actor  i gets 3 points more than  his or her best altemative  (10),  but  j gets 11 
points more than  his or her alternative  (zero).  Thus  equidependence  between  i 
and j has not been reached.  Negotiation  is assumed to continue  until i gets 17 
points  and  j gets 7 points.  Here,  equidependence  has been  attained  because  both 
i and j get 7 more points from exchange with each other than they would 
outside the ij relation.  Actor  i's power is defined  as the maximum  profit  she or 
he can obtain  from any partner. 
EXPECTED  VALUE THEORY 
Friedkin's  (1992)  expected  value theory  first identifies  all subnetworks  that  can 
result  from  various  patterns  of exchanges.  Expected  values  are  predictions  about 
a structure's  outcomes determined by weighting the value of a predicted 
outcome  by the probability  of its occurrence.  For  example,  in the four-actor  line 
network,  A1-BI-B2-A2,  there are two possible exchange  patterns.  Either  each B 
exchanges  with its related  A, or the two Bs exchange  with each other.  To make 
predictions from initial conditions, Friedkin  assumes that either pattern is 
equally likely to occur. Actor i is dependent  on actor  j if failure to exchange 
with actor  j results in i's exclusion from exchange.  Dependency  is an actor's 
likelihood of being excluded,  calculated  over all possible exchange  outcomes. 
An offer-making  function  translates  a particular  degree  of dependency  into an 
offer to a potential  exchange  partner.  Predicted  earnings  from exchange  are a 
function  of reciprocal  offers  modified  by compromises  when offers  are  inconsis- 
tent. 
EXCHANGE RESISTANCE  THEORY 
Skvoretz and Willer (1993) use  the likelihood of being included and the 
resistance  model to make  "baseline"  predictions  for exchange  in both  strong  and 
weak power structures.  Their  goal is a simple formula  that can be used in a 
single step to yield predictions  in all exchange  networks.  We give their  formula 
for predicting  the profit of actor i using the notation  for our own resistance- 
likelihood  assumption: 
In(M - Pi)  1- 
ln(P,)  1, 
They assume that conflict  points and maximum  expectations  for profit for all 
actors  remain  constant.  The conflict  point for all actors  is assumed to be zero, 
and their maximum  expectation  for profit is assumed to be the entire profit 
pool. A power function is then applied in which the difference  between the 
maximum  expectation  for profit  and what an actor  would receive  from  an offer 
is raised to the power of that actor's  likelihood  of being included  in exchange. 
The equiresistance  equation  can then be reduced to the above equation  using 
natural  logarithms. 142 /  Social Forces  74:1, September 1995 
All five theories make ratio-scale  predictions for at least some of the 
network  relations  we examined.  Below  we compare  our predictions  to those of 
the five alternative  theories  and to experimental  results. 
Results 
Four groups of subjects  participated  in Stem and Kite experiments,  and five 
groups in the four-line  and Double  Branch  2. All were university  students  who 
signed up to participate  in paid experiments.  In Table  1, the column headed 
GPI-RD  shows the  predictions  for our  new model  that  integrates  GPI,  resistance, 
and degree.  The  column  headed  GPI-R  shows the predictions  for our resistance 
model without the biasing effects of degree. Also shown are the predictions 
from five alternative  models and the observed means by network relation. 
Because  we assume that profits approach  predicted  equilibria  over a series of 
negotiations,  we use data from the final experimental  periods.Yn 
Observed  profits  conform  well to GPI-RD  predictions.  The  largest  discrepan- 
cy between  a predicted  and an observed  value is less than  one profit  unit. One- 
sample t tests determined  the probability  that the differences  between  predic- 
tions and observed  means were due to chance.  No GPI-RD  prediction  differed 
significantly from its  corresponding observed mean at  or below the  .40 
probability  level. The smallest  probability  that  a prediction  did not differ  from 
the observed value was  .47 for the Kite network. Two predictions from 
Coleman's  (1973,  1990)  rational  exchange  model,  while not as close, were better 
than those of other  alternatives.  The probability  that  rational  exchange  predic- 
tions did not differ  from observed  values was .13 for the four-line  and .11 for 
the Stem. In contrast,  significant differences  were found between observed 
means and the predictions  of other alternative  theories.  For the Kite network, 
Skvoretz and Willer's (1993)  exchange  resistance  model, GPI-RD,  Cook and 
Yamagishi's  (1992)  equidependence  model,  and  Friedkin's  (1992)  expected  value 
model  all make  acceptably  close  predictions.  However,  both  the  equidependence 
and expected  value models predict  no difference  in power between D and E 
actors in the Kite -  a difference  that did occur in an empirical  test and was 
statistically  significant  (Markovsky  et al. 1993). 
Establishing  a GPI-RD  prediction  for the  Double  Branch  2 network  requires 
some interpretation.  Calculating  degree  as for a one-exchange  network,  Fs have 
three direct ties and Gs have one. The GPI-RD  model then yields predicted 
profits  for F of 15.33,  about  1 profit  point away from  the observed  value. A one- 
sample t test also finds this difference  significant:  t(63)  =  2.29,  p = .03.  However, 
degree can be calculated differently  when two exchanges are allowed. Fs 
exchange  twice per round  while Gs exchange  only once. At the beginning  of a 
round,  F has three  potential  exchange  partners.  If F's first  exchange  in a round 
is with a G, then there are two actors left with whom to attempt  a second 
exchange.  If Fs first exchange  with each other,  then they have three  actors  left 
with whom to attempt  a second exchange.  Fs then  have either  five or six direct 
ties while Gs have only one. If F's first exchange  is with a G on two-thirds  of 
the rounds (i.e., F is indifferent  between the other F and its two Gs), then Fs 
effectively  have 5.33 direct ties. This produces a GPI-RD  prediction  for F in Negotiated  Exchanges in Networks /  143 
TABLE  1:  Goodness of  Fite for Predicted and  Observed Profits in  Exchange 
Networks 
Models  and  Predictions  Observed 
Means 
Core  Rational  Equi-  Expected Exchange  GPI-R  GPI-RD 
Structure,  Exchange depend.  Value  Resistance 
Relation 
4-Line 
B-A  16.0  15.0**  16.0  21.0  16.0  13.5  14.5*  14.4 
t (29)  4.27  1.54  4.27  13.01  4.27  -2.54  0.18 
Steme 
A-B  20.1  17.2*  18.0  22.0  18.3  14.4*  15.6*  15.9 
t(13)  5.46  1.72  2.76  7.91  3.15  -1.88  -0.33 
Kite 
D-E  unstable 15.2*  12.0*  12.0***  12.5*  12.2**  13.7*'*  12.8 
t(7)  1.95  -0.61  -0.61  -0.20  -0.46  0.77 
Double 
Branch  2 
F-G  16.8w  13.8  16.0*  20.2  14.6  133  163*  16.4 
t(63)  0.93  -5.68  -0.82  838  -3.89  -6.69  -0.14 
a One-sample  t tests  were  used  to estimate  the  probability  of no difference  between  prediction 
and observation.  Larger  p values suggest an increased  likelihood  that prediction  and 
observation  are  identical.  Degrees  of freedom  are  in parentheses. 
b Predictions  are  for  profits  of the  first  position  listed  in a relation;  here,  for  example,  actor  B 
in B-A. 
c The  A-C  relation  is also of interest  in this  network  However,  during  the last  period  of the 
experiment,  A exchanged  with  C only  twice,  both  times  at 14-10.  This  precludes  meaningful 
comparison.  With  that  caveat,  we report  only  for  completeness  that  the  GPI-RD  prediction  of 
13.7  for  this  relation  was closest  among  the  models,  though  the  equidependence  and  rational 
exchange  models  were  also  close. 
*  p>.05  "  p>.10  p>.20  p  p>.40 
exchange with G of 16.31. A t test finds no difference between this value and 
the  observed  mean,  16.36,  t(63)  -  -.14,  p  -  .89. While  this  is  the  closest 
prediction  of  any  model,  Table 1 shows  that the Bienenstock and  Bonacich 
(1992,1993) core and Cook and Yamagishi (1992) equidependence models also 
make acceptable predictions for the Double Branch 2. 
In sum,  the GPI model  incorporating resistance and degree formulations 
produced very accurate predictions for exchange outcomes. These predictions 
were  superior to alternative models  in their goodness  of fit to experimental 
data: Only GPI-RD  makes acceptably close predictions (  > .40 of no difference 
between predicted and observed values) for all four experimental networks. 144 /  Social Forces  74:1, September  1995 
EXPERIMENT  I  REBSCD-INFORMATON  NETWORKS 
There is  a  theoretical distinction between full- and restricted-information 
settings  used for  network  exchange  experiments.  Full-information  settings  more 
closely  model rational,  forward-looking  actors  who use whatever  information  is 
available.  Restricted-information  settings conform  better to backward-looking 
actors who adjust their response only on the basis of their experience  in the 
situation. Our model requires that, minimally, three information  conditions 
must be satisfied  for negotiated  social exchanges  to occur:16  (1) An actor  in the 
network  must be informed  of, and have access to, other  actors  with whom it is 
possible to exchange.  We assume that actors negotiate separately  with each 
potential partner  and are thus aware of each partner  as a distinct person or 
organizational  unit.  Implicitly,  then,  actors  also know the  number  of others  with 
whom it is possible to exchange.  (2)  The actor  must be informed  of whether  an 
exchange  has been completed  with each  potential  partner.  (3)  The  actor  must be 
informed of the magnitude  of her or his profits from exchanges.  In order to 
evaluate  an offer,  it must  be at least  ordinally  scalable.  This  requires  information 
on the offer's  relative  magnitude.  In a typical  experiment,  this takes  the form  of 
an agreement  between two partners to allocate a pool of resources at the 
conclusion  of a given negotiation  round.  Implicitly,  if actors  know the magni- 
tude of the offer  upon which agreement  was reached,  then they also know the 
magnitude of their own shares of subsequent  resource  allocations  stemming 
from the agreement.  Knowledge  of others'  profits  is not essential.  Therefore,  to 
examine  the empirical  scope of our model, we examine  data  from experiments 
in a new, restricted-information  setting that differs in several ways from the 
full-information  setting described  above.  The new setting restricts  information 
to the minimum  necessary  for the operation  of factors  deemed  important  in the 
model. 
As our theory  evolves, refinements  in its predictions  demand  that  we study 
increasingly  subtle network exchange  phenomena.  Consequently,  our experi- 
mental setting must be made increasingly  sensitive to predicted  phenomena, 
and it must exert more stringent  controls over potentially  extraneous  factors 
such as equity concerns.  We have attempted  to accomplish  this by creating  a 
new experimental  setting that spreads the negotiation  process across a larger 
number of  rounds and limits information  to  the minimum necessary for 
negotiation  and exchange.  Each  subject  has information  only on his or her own 
(1) negotiations  and exchanges,  (2) potential profit vis-A-vis  particular  offers 
received from others, and (3) realized profit when an exchange occurs. In 
addition, subjects  negotiate for many more rounds because a subject's  intra- 
round negotiations  with a partner  are simplified to a choice of three options: 
increase  or decrease  the previous offer  by one "profit  point"  or do not change 
the previous offer.  Cook et al. (1983)  limit information  in a similar  fashion  but 
allow subjects  to select their offers  from a wide range of possibilities  on each 
round.  The new setting then makes  possible  tests of our theory  under  informa- 
tion conditions similar to  those of  earlier restricted-information  exchange 
experiments. 
Custom software was used to configure  networked  PCs.17  Subjects  were 
isolated  in separate  rooms and knew only the coded designations  for their  own Negotiated  Exchanges  in Networks  /  145 
potential exchange partners.  They were informed that the shape of the full 
network would not be revealed and that their potential  partners  might have 
other potential partners  of their own. An interactive  tutorial  guided subjects 
through  the  mechanics  of conducting  negotiations  via the  computerized  system. 
On each  round,  subjects  sent messages  to a central  computer  telling  it the lowest 
amount  of profit they were willing to accept  from each potential  partner.  If an 
agreement  was reached,  the subject  was informed  of this fact  but did not know 
the amount of profit received by the partner;  only her or his own profit was 
reported.  Subjects  completed  a total  of 60 rounds  at the same network  position. 
Each  relation  contained  30 profit points at the outset of each round, although 
subjects  did not know the pool size. At the outset of negotiations,  each partner 
could receive 15 points from an agreement,  which was awarded  as a 15-cent 
"bonus"  for reaching  an agreement.  Subjects  could raise or lower the amount 
they were willing to accept  from each partner  by 1 point, or leave the amount 
unchanged.  Each  1-point  change resulted  in a 1-cent  change  in the amount of 
bonus  for agreement.  The  computer  declared  an agreement  when the sum of the 
profits  for which two potential  exchange  partners  were willing to settle did not 
exceed 30 points. If the sum was less than 30 points, the computer  split the 
excess and awarded  half to each subject  in addition  to the amount  on which she 
or he had settled. 
Because  subjects  made offers  to all potential  partners  on each round,  some 
could reach  provisional  agreements  with more  than  one partner.  Due to the fact 
that subjects  were allowed only one agreement  on each round, the central 
computer  used the following  algorithm  to prioritize  agreements:  (1)  Assign zero 
profit to subjects  who do not reach any provisional  agreement.  (2) For those 
who remain,  declare  agreements  for pairs of subjects  whose best deals are  with 
each other. (3) Select  a subject  randomly  from those remaining  and award her 
or his best deal. (4) Repeat the random selection until no more deals are 
possible. 
This restricted-information  setting differs  from the full-information  setting 
in several important  ways.18  Nevertheless,  the settings are identical  in several 
respects crucial to our model. First, in both settings the number of direct 
relations  a subject  has to others  is immediately  apparent  and obvious.  Therefore, 
degree can influence profit expectations.  Second, in both settings, actors can 
over time get a sense of the range of acceptable  terms through experiencing 
rounds  in which they are excluded  from  exchange  and rounds  in which they are 
included. (This is  true in  the restricted-information  setting even if  some 
inclusions have a chance element because of computer intervention  when 
multiple provisional exchanges  could be made.) Therefore,  excludability  can 
influence  expectations.  On the basis of these essential  similarities,  we make  the 
same predictions  for profit differentials  by position at equilibrium  in the new 
restricted-information  setting. That  is, exchange  rates in the last rounds of an 
experiment  should be comparable  across  settings.19 146 /  Social Forces  74:.1,  September 1995 
RESULTS 
Eleven groups participated  in  the Stem network. We treated the last ten 
agreements  in a session for each relation as an indicator  of its equilibrium 
exchange  rate.  This provides sufficient  cases for a stringent  statistical  test and 
roughly corresponds  to our use of last-period  results in the full-information 
experiments.  For the A-B relation,  the last ten agreements  varied by no more 
than a few points in all groups, allowing us to conclude  that equilibrium  had 
been reached. The maximum range over which agreements  varied was 4 
(M = 2.0;  Std. dev. = 1.05).20  In exchanges  with B, the subject  in the A position 
achieved mean profit of 20.13 (std. dev. -  4.29) out of a pool of 30 points, 
compared  to the GPI-RD  predicted  level of 19.5.  A one-sample  t test found no 
difference  between prediction  and observation,  t(10)  -  -.49, p -  .64. Profit  of 
20.13  on a 30-point  scale is equivalent  to 16.10  on a 24-point  scale,  and thus  very 
close to the 15.86  observed  in the full-information  experiment. 
In  previously reported experiments using  the  Stem network (Cook, 
Donnelly & Yamagishi  1992; Markovsky  et al. 1993), A-C exchanges were 
infrequent.  We had hoped that with 60 rounds in the new setting, we could 
establish an equilibrium  value for this relation.  This was not the case. A-C 
exchanges were still infrequent,  especially during the final 30 rounds of a 
session.  Two groups  had no A-C  exchanges  during  the last 30 rounds,  and only 
four groups had ten or more. With such limited data,  we lack confidence  that 
equilibrium  was reached.  However,  we attempted  to test our prediction  for A 
in the A-C relation by taking the overall mean for all A-C exchanges that 
occurred  in the last half of a session (M -  17.46, Std. dev. -  3.77). GPI-RD 
predicts  A will receive  17.10  profit  units  at equilibrium,  a difference  of less than 
half a profit  unit from  the observed  mean.  A t test found no difference  between 
predicted and observed values, t(82) -  -.88, p -  .38. While this result does 
support the GPI-RD  model, the variability  in frequency  of exchange  argues 
against  giving it much weight. 
A significant  difference  was found in the C1-C2  relation.  As with the A-B 
relation,  we were able to use Cl's mean  profit  for the last ten exchanges  for  each 
group  as an indicator  of the equilibrium  exchange  rate  in C-C2 (M  -  18.18,  Std. 
dev. -  4.31).  This difference  in profit  between  isomorphic  network  positions  is 
puzzling;  all models predict  an equal,  15:15,  division of profit Comparing  this 
predicted  value to the observed  mean, we find that t(10)  -  -2.45,  p -  .03. The 
anomalous  finding  may be a chance  occurrence,  or an artifact  of the experimen- 
tal setting:  The program  treats C1  and C2  identically,  with the one exception 
being that C1  appears above C2 as a potential partner  on A's video screen. 
Possibly  because  of simple  ordering,  A may pay more  attention  to C1  than  to C2, 
thereby  affecting  C's negotiations  with C1  in Cl's favor.  While this might not 
affect  the A-C or A-B equilibrium  values (and thus show how robust  GPI-RD 
predictions  are for these relations),  it could affect the C1  - (2  value. For the 
present,  we regard  this finding as a spur to additional  research  rather  than as 
a disconfirmation  of GPI-RD,  since the finding is completely  unanticipated  by 
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To summarize,  we replicated  our test of the GPI-RD  model using the Stem 
network  in an information-restricted  exchange  situation.  The key hypotheses 
were again supported. 
Dliscussion  and Conclusions 
We developed  a theory  to explain  how actors  in social  exchange  networks  reach 
agreements  on divisions of resources.  The model incorporates  previous ideas 
about the effects that network structure  has on the power of individual 
positions,  specifically  the graph-theoretical  power index of network  exchange 
theory and its weak power extension (Markovsky,  Wilier & Patton 1998; 
Markovsky  et al. 1993).  To this model we added theoretical  ideas borrowed 
from several  areas  of sociology. 
From  elementary  theory's  concept  of resistance,  we borrowed  the idea that 
actors  balance  two competing  interests  to reach  agreement  in exchange:  (1)  their 
"best  hope" for maximum  profit and (2) their "worst  fear"  of being excluded 
from  exchange  entirely.  We combined  this  with an idea from  network  exchange 
theory:  likelihood of being included  in exchange  ranks  the power of network 
actors.  This resulted  in a new assumption:  Actors'  best hopes and worst fears 
are proportional  to their  likelihood  of being included  in exchange.  Actors  who 
are frequently  excluded  from exchanges  (and profit)  are likely to lower both 
their maximum and  minimum aspirations for profit. Conversely, actors 
frequently  included in exchanges  become accustomed  to receiving  profit and 
raise their expectations accordingly.  Integrating  these previous theoretical 
strands  yielded a model that  generates  ratio-scale  predictions  for the outcomes 
of negotiating  actors  in exchange  networks. 
The fact that actors adjust  their expectations  through  negotiation  implies 
that  structural  power differences  emerge  over time. In strong  power networks 
identified by  network exchange theory, these differences never reach an 
equilibrium  point short of the point of extreme  differentiation.  They continue 
until powerful actors receive all  (or nearly all) available resources from 
exchange  with less powerful  actors.  In weak power structures,  an equilibrium 
point is reached  well short of maximum  differentiation.  It is this equilibrium 
point that we attempt  to predict  theoretically  and measure  experimentally. 
We felt that  the equilibrium  point eventually  reached  will likely  be affected 
by actors'  initial  expectations  formed  on the basis  of prominent  features  of their 
structural  context.  From  network  analysis  we borrowed  the idea that  an actor's 
degree,  the number  of her or his direct  ties to other  actors,  would influence  her 
or his initial expectations  for success in exchange.  That is, actors  with more 
direct ties would be biased toward resisting  exchange  offers that they would 
otherwise accept. We included degree as a biasing factor in predicting  the 
equilibrium  exchange  point that  experimental  subjects  would eventually  reach. 
Results  of an experimental  test in a setting  specifically  designed  to measure  the 
equilibrium  point suggest that our theoretical  integration  was successful.  This 
brings  up potential  avenues  for  future  research.  The  theory  suggests  that  actors' 
expectations  have significant effects on resource distribution  only in weak 
power networks.  What effects, if any, do expectations  have in strong power 148 /  Social Forces  74:1, September 1995 
networks?  Also, certain  expectations  about the social structure  were shown to 
have important  effects in weak power networks.  Do other kinds of cognition 
have important  effects?  And under  what conditions  are cognitions  likely to be 
more or less important? 
Our  extension  of network  exchange  theory  provides  a number  of advantag- 
es over earlier  versions  and current  alternatives.  By highlighting  the ways that 
actors'  profit  expectations  interact  with structural  properties  of their  locations  in 
the network,  it generates  predictions  for all positions  in weak power networks 
on a ratio rather than an ordinal level of measurement.  Moreover, these 
predictions  are more accurate  than those of alternative  theories,  and the theory 
generalizes  across experimental  designs. Our predictions  closely approximate 
experimental  results from the full-information  experiments  of Skvoretz and 
Wilier  (1991,1993),  the restricted-information  experiments  of Cook,  Donnelly  & 
Yamagishi  (1992),  and the results  reported  here  for equilibrium  rates  in both  full 
and restricted settings. In addition, results reported by  Bienenstock and 
Bonacich  (1993)  for two weak power networks,  the four-actor  line and Kite,  are 
extremely  close to our predictions.  Their  experimental  setting  has features  quite 
different  from either the Skvoretz  and Wilier  or Cook,  Donnelly & Yamagishi 
designs. This remarkable  convergence of experimental  results in  different 
settings demonstrates  both the increased precision of  the theory and its 
enhanced  generality. 
The empirical results also clearly suggest that equity concerns are not 
inextricably  woven into social exchange  network  settings.  This  is not to say that 
equity effects are unimportant,  but rather  that equity is a distinct  process that 
may or may not be activated  in a given social context  and that depends upon 
whether certain  conditions are satisfied (Markovsky  1985).  In developing our 
restricted-information  setting,  we struggled  with the  powerful  effects  of subjects' 
equity concerns  when they felt they were receiving  less than a partner  who in 
other ways was their status equal. In some cases, subjects  would refuse to 
exchange  in as many as 50 out of 60 rounds because another  subject  would 
receive more profit than they would. That  is, subjects  would refuse  five or six 
dollars in pay to avoid receiving a few pennies less than their partner in 
exchange.  This study demonstrates  that once equity concerns  are controlled, 
different experimental settings produce comparable structural effects on 
resource distributions  resulting from exchange.  Structural  positions have an 
effect  on power independent  of equity  concerns.  An interesting  area  for further 
inquiry is exactly how equity effects combine with the effect of structural 
position under different  conditions  to produce  power and profit differences  in 
social exchange  networks. 
Let us note that the equation  for actor profit, Pi, converges  with part of 
Cook and Yamagishi's  (1992)  theory  -  their equation  Ri, -  (P1  + Af1  -  Ajd/2. 
In this model, Ri,  is the profit  that  actor  i obtains  in exchange  with partner and 
corresponds  to our P* P11  is the pool size and corresponds  to P; Aij  is the best 
alternative  available  to i, which  corresponds  to Cij,  i's expected  conflict  outcome. 
That is, i's best alternative  is the least amount of profit i expects if exchange 
withj does not occur.  A11  is7js  best alternative,  i.e., Cii.  Despite  these  similarities, 
however, our model diverges  from Cook and Yamagishi's  in significant  ways. 
Unlike Ai1,  which refers to the objective profit under "conflict," C11  is assumed Negotiated  Exchanges  in Networks  /  149 
to be a subjective  assessment  or expectation  of long-range  profit  from  failure  to 
reach  agreement.  We believe that  one reason  for our model's  predictive  success 
stems from this incorporation  of the actor's  point of view. This allows the new 
model to generate  contrasting  predictions  that  are  here  shown  to be significantly 
more accurate  than alternatives. 
Although the predictions  that we derived are accurate  for the networks 
tested, these findings tell us only that the model is developing in potentially 
fruitful directions.  Establishing  its broader  generality  will require  continued 
testing  in a wider variety  of networks.  Further  enhancements  will be required 
to allow predictions  with theoretical  restrictions  further  relaxed.  Of  course,  these 
have been our goals all along: to generate  increasingly  precise and accurate 
predictions  for network exchange  outcomes under increasingly  robust condi- 
tions.  With  the theoretical  and empirical  developments  reported  above,  we have 
worked toward  achieving  these goals. 150  /  Social Forces  74:1, September 1995 
APPENDDI:  Network Exchange  Theory 
Key Ternu 
p -  power  h -  length of the longest nonintersecting  path 
d -  domain  m -dk m number of  i's nonintersecting  paths of  length k in 
domain d. 
i,j  -  network  positions  e -  maxumum  exchanges  per round 
A network  path is a series of connected  positions, e.g., A-B-C-D.  Two paths stemming  from a 
given position i are nonintersecting  only if i is the only position  common  to both.  Thus,  relative 
to the A position,  A-B-C-D  and A-B-E-F  are intersecting  paths (at B),  but neither  intersects  with 
A-GCH. 
Domains are network substructures.  When e > 1, a position can have different  power 
indices  within different  domains  (see Markovsky,  Willer  &  Patton  1988).  The  following  criterion 
deteImines  whether i and j are in the same domain.  First,  define an e+ position as one having 
more than e relations.  Then, given the set V of all positions on a path (i.e., a series of linked 
positions) between i and j, i and j are in the same domain only if there  exists a path such that 
either  V -  (0), or all positions in V are e+ positions. 
SCOPE  CONDMTIONS 
The theory is deemed applicable  when the following conditions  are met or approximated: 
1. All actors use identical strategies  in negotiating  exchanges. 
2. Actors consistently  excluded from exchanges  raise their offers. 
3. Those consistently  included in exchanges  lower their offers. 
4. Actors accept the best offer they receive and choose randomly  in deciding among tied best 
offers. 
5. Each  position is related to, and seeks exchange  with, one or more other  positions. 
6. At the start of an exchange round, equal pools of positively valued resource units are 
available in every relation. 
7. Two positions receive resources from their common pool if and only if they exchange 
(Markovsky,  Wilier & Patton  1988:223). 
AXIOMS 
Four axioms determine the relative power of connected positions and whether they will 
exchange: 
(1 )h 
Axiom!1.  PLd(ed)  11  Ls  kL  IL  dk 
ed)  k-i 
Axiom  2.  i seeks exchange  with j only if p  > pj, or if (v  -  p)  t i- pk) for all k related to i. 
Axiom  3.  i and j can exchange  only if each seeks exchange  with the other. 
Axiom  4.  If i and j exchange,  then i receives more resources  than  j if and only if pi > pj. Negotiated  Exchanges in Networks /  151 
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WEAK  AND SIRONG  POWER 
Markovsky et al.  (1993) provide an iterative method, GPI,  used to  derive more precise 
hypotheses. 
Step  1.  Apply Axiom 2 to determine  exchange  seeks. 
Step  2.  Apply Axiom 3 to remove nonmutual  exchange  seeks. 
Step  3.  Apply Axiom 1 to each subnetwork  that results from Step 2; p -  1 for isolates. 
Step  4.  Re-form  the full network  with new p values; repeat from Step 1 until values do not 
change. 
If after  the above analyses  Pi > pj for actors  in the i - j relation,  then i has strong  power over 
and it is predicted that profits from exchange  in this relation  will favor i and approach  their 
maximum  differentiation.  If pi - pj,  then there  are exactly  two possibilities:  either  the actors  are 
equal in power, or else one has weak power over the other. 
Weak power differences  are detected using a probability  analysis.  The analysis assumes 
that actors seek exchanges randomly among their potential partners and counts relative 
proportions of mutual exchange seeks as exchange likelihoods. If i  and j  have unequal 
exchange likelihoods, then the actor with the higher likelihood is predicted to have a weak 
power advantage over the other. This is identified as GPI3.  Examples of its application are 
provided  in Markovsky  et al. (1993)  and in the theoretical  discussion  of this article.  A computer 
program for calculating likelihood of inclusion is available at no charge from the second 
author. 
Notes 
1. It should be noted, however, that network  exchange  theory  predictions  also generally  agree 
with data from exchange  situations  with greater  information  restrictions,  e.g., Cook,  Donnelly, 
and Yamagishi (1992), Cook and Emerson  (1978),  and Cook et al. (1983),  and also from the 
setting used by Bienenstock  and Bonacich  (1993). 
2. These conditions are probably  sufficient  but not necessary  to determine  whether a network 
displays strong  power. In general,  casual inspection  often fails to classify  networks  properly  as 
strong power or weak power. Full application  of the GPI  method is required. 
3. Theoretical  integration  requires integration  of notation systems as well. Markovsky  et al. 
(1993)  use the notation  pfiJ  to denote the probability  of inclusion of position i in an exchange 
network. But the letter p  also occurs in resistance equations to  denote profit. To avoid 
confusion and simplify our notation,  we switch to Ii (actor  i's likelihood  of exchange). 
4. C1  is similar  to Thibaut  and Kelley's  (1959)  'comparison  level for altematives"  or CLALT,  i.e., 
"the lowest level  of outcomes a member will  accept in the light of available alternative 
opportunities"  (21).  Mi and C1  define the range of possible offers.  The model does not assume 
that actors  have objective  knowledge of their values. "Best  hopes" and "worst  fears"  need not 
be reasonable,  though actors  are likely to refine  their  estimates  as they interact.  We have again 
simplified the notation of earlier  presentations  of the theory:  e.g., Wilier,  Markovsky  & Patton 
(1989)  use PMAX(A)  to represent  Mi and PCON(A)  to represent  Ci. 
5. Assumptions are evaluated on their effectiveness in producing testable hypotheses that 
conforn well with observation.  The  assumption  that  actors  exchange  when their  resistances  are 
equal has been very fruitful  in previous  studies (Skvoretz  &  Willer  1993;  Willer  1987),  including 
cross-national  comparisons  (Willer  & Szmatka  1993). 
6. Cook and Yamagishi  (1992)  also suggest that the idea of a limit to power use in networks 
holds promise  for a general  formula  to predict  resource  distribution.  Willer (1987)  demonstrat- 152 /  Social Forces  74:1, September 1995 
ed  such generality when he  applied the resistance model to a  wide  variety of network 
situations both inside and outside the laboratory. 
7. Individuals  participating  in experiments  or acting  in natural  exchange  situations  will exhibit 
a range of "best hopes" and "worst fears."  This in no way interferes  with the model's ability 
to predict  exchange rates.  Coalitions  among actors  are ruled out by the scope conditions  of the 
theory though they may occur often in exchange situations. Erger (1993) has extended the 
theory to include the effects of coalitions. 
8. Markovsky  et al. (1993) provide support for this idea. They found that ordinal predictions 
for  weak  power  networks based on  likelihood of  being included were  more strongly 
corroborated  for experienced  than for inexperienced  subjects. 
9. While simple proportionality  is a straightforward  way to incorporate  likelihood of being 
included into the resistance  model, other  specifications  are possible.  For  example,  Skvoretz  and 
Willer (1993)  take the difference  between Ml and Pi, then raise it to the power of i. Our model 
is the simplest expression  we could devise of the theoretical  idea that actors'  worst fears and 
best hopes in the exchange  situation depend on -  and are proportional  to -  the likelihood of 
their being included in exchanges. 
10. The mathematical  derivation  is available on request  from the first author. 
11. Markovsky  (1988)  specifies the conditions  under  which anchoring  will occur.  judgments  are 
indeterminate,  an anchor  is available,  and anchors  are salient.  These  conditions  are satisfied in 
experimental  tests of network  exchange  theory.  Markovsky's  'anchoring  proposition"  predicts 
when assimilation  as opposed to contrast  effects will be observed.  According  to this proposi- 
tion, assimilation  would be predicted  in the present  context  because degree informs  best-hope 
and worst-fear  outcomes,  each of which appears  on the same scale as the "response' variable, 
i.e., expected profit. (An anchor on the stimulus scale -  as in the temperature  example - 
produces a contrast  effect.) 
12. An actor's maximum expectation for profit may differ among exchange partners  in the 
same way. 
13. In a replication  using a different  experimental  exchange  setting, Bienenstock  and Bonacich 
(1993)  obtained similar results. 
14. Some readers of earlier versions of this article noted the similarity between network 
exchange and noncooperative  game theory (e.g., Harsanyi 1980; Nash 1951; Osbome 1990; 
Rosenthal & Rubinstein 1984, Rubinstein 1982, 1991). Also, the few experimental tests of 
noncooperative game theory use experimental situations similar to that used in network 
exchange  experiments  but without the complication  of network  structure  (see, e.g., Nydegger 
& Owen 1974). While intriguing, these similarities mask very real difficulties in applying 
noncooperative game theory to network exchange. Rubinstein (1982) states the bargaining 
problem  in noncooperative  game theory  as "Two  individuals  have before  them several  possible 
contractual  agreements.  Both have interests in reaching  agreement  but their interests are not 
entirely identical. What 'will  be' the agreed contract, assuming that both parties behave 
rationally?"  (97). He goes on to distinguish this problem from two others: "(i) the positive 
question -  what is the agreement  reached in practice;  (ii) the normative  question -  what is 
the just agreement."  Perhaps  because of these distinctions,  noncooperative  game theory  places 
little emphasis on theory testing through  experimental  or field research  and does not fare well 
in  experimental tests. Network exchange theories place more emphasis on  the  'positive 
question,"  on how subjects  behave in controlled  settings.  Experimental  results  are then used to 
inform theoretical  development in cumulative research  programs.  Bienenstock  and Bonacich 
have made the most successful use of game theoxy  to analyze network  exchange  structures. 
15. Markovsky et al. (1993) and Skvoretz and Willer (1993) analyze data from these full 
infomzation  experiments.  Markovsky  et al. (1993)  use data from the Stem and Kite networks; 
Skvoretz  and WilIer  use data from all four experiments.  Their  analyses are based on all rounds 
of the experiments.  Here we use data from just the last period, which is four rounds long. 
Although suitable for  testing ordinal predictions, using  the  mean of  all  rounds in  an 
experiment  as an indicator  of power is problematic  for testing exact predictions.  For example, 
exchange  may begin at an even split of the profit pool, 1212, in early rounds then progress  to 
a stable pattern  of 20:4  exchanges.  In this case, 20:4  is a good estimate of the power difference Negotiated  Exchanges in Networks /  153 
in the relationship. The mean exchange rate for all rounds (about 16:8) would seriously 
underestimate  the magnitude of the equilibrated  power difference. 
16. Our  model requires  these assumptions;  we do not assume that all naturally  occurring  social 
exchanges  satisfy these conditions. 
17. This  system was designed to be relatively  "low-tech"  and portable  to other  laboratories.  The 
software is written in Microsoft  QuickBASIC  (4.5),  and PCs are connected  in a ring configura- 
tion via cables connected to standard  serial ports. The ring consists of one master  control PC 
and any number  of subject  PCs. The program  is available from the authors  upon request. 
18. Equity  concerns,  for instance,  are controlled  in the two settings in different  ways. If actors 
feel the exchange  situation is unfair,  they may refuse to accept the best offer  available  to them. 
The full-information  setting described  solves the potential  equity problem  by rotating  subjects 
through  all positions. Actors disadvantaged  in one position know they will be compensated 
when they rotate through an advantaged position. Restricted-information  settings in which 
subjects typically do not change positions solve the problem by not telling a subject the 
earnings of his or her partner in order to prevent comparison of subject's rewards with 
partner's  rewards. 
19. Because of the differences  in intraround  negotiation options and total number  of rounds 
between the two settings, we would not expect averages from all rounds to be similar across 
settings. The restriction to  equilibrium rates is  essential to  the  "no setting difference" 
prediction. 
20. In contrast,  the first ten A-B agreements  for each group varied more  widely; the maximum 
range was 9 (M -  4.23, Std. dev. -  235). The mean range of the first ten agreements  was 
significantly  greater  than the mean range of the last ten agreements,  t(10) - 3.09, p -  .01. 
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